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This paper discusses the passion of Islamization of the New Order, at the 
same time the mainstream of this power is based on economic development 
that provides opportunities for the growth of the Muslim middle class. Pa-
tronage model used by the New Order gives an indication that the power 
built by this regime wants to instill a strong influence in society.  At the same 
time, the New Order is depoliticizing the political attitudes of Muslims. This 
has implications for the marginalization of the interests of Muslims on the 
national stage. In this study will also be affirmed the influence of the New Or-
der’s power on the presence of the Muslim middle class. On the one hand their 
birth was the result of the economic development that the New Order echoed. 
On a different aspect, the presence of the middle class gives strong legitimacy 
that they are part of the dominating class structure in a country. Also will be 
reviewed about middle-class interference with the trend of Islamic populism 
that actually occurred in the era of the 80s, but re-spread after post-reform. 
Popular Islamic culture becomes a trend that spread through various media 
such as, internet, magazines, newspapers and so forth. This has received con-
siderable response from middle-class Muslims and led to commodification. 
Religion facilitates to interact with modernity. Materialistic and hedonistic 
interests intersect with obedience in the practice of religion. On the one hand, 
the mode of consumption of the Muslim middle class changes with the adap-
tation of piety values  in the public sphere.
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INTRODUCTION
The early birth of the New Order regime was motivated by a very complex 
economic and political crisis. The national economy at that time was in a 
very poor condition. As Harold Crouch described, in 1965 inflation reached 
500 percent, and rice prices soared 900 percent (Crouch,1986:67). It started 
on March 11, 1966 when he succeeded President Sukarno. With the current 
support of ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces), Soeharto stabilized the direction 
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of domestic political policy by controlling almost all aspects of government 
including economic, political, social aspects creating good economic growth 
and domestic stability ( Vatikiotis,1993: 1, ix-x).
In the unfavorable economic and political situation, whoever leads should 
prevent the crisis from getting worse by implementing a strategy of political 
and economic stability. Soeharto with all his convictions convinced the 
people that the new regime he built was the legitimate and constitutional heir 
of President Sukarno. According to Salim Said (2016:10), Seoharto’s capital 
actually comes to power in addition to harnessing military power. He used the 
“anger” of the people in the communist party (PKI). He realized that despite 
his lack of charisma and political experience over his predecessors, but with 
a keen sense of power instinct, Suharto was sure his rule would be lasting. 
The political reference used by Soerharto is free-active, which tends to follow 
America. The New Order’s interest in the aspects of economic development 
altered Suharto’s view of western capitalism. In addition to the economic 
issues that became the jargon of the New Order, domestic politics of Suharto’s 
main concern also needed attention. Some countries that become relations 
of Indonesia such as, Autralia, Japan and other Asian countries get special 
attention. On the other hand, the New Order’s strong desire to develop the 
national economy, and the welfare of the people’s life, are characteristic of this 
regime (Ricklefs,2008: 587-589).
DEPOLITICIZING THE REGIME AGAINST MUSLIMS
The authoritarianism adopted by the New Order received the attention of 
Saiful Mujani, by adopting some western scholars opinions such as Anderson 
(1972) which explains that because Suharto was a man of Javanese tradition, 
the source of authoritarianism that he embraced came from Javanese political 
culture which did not recognize democracy. Another case with Samson 
(1973), in fact the modernist Muslim elite has a strong fighting spirit for the 
Islamization of the country. However, on the other hand it does not seem to 
get a good reception on the power elite so that it has a difficulty in realizing a 
moderate political climate during the New Order (Mujani, 2007:30).
The Muslim’s desire to re-take does not seem to be welcome, Soerharto not only 
got rid of the PKI but also removed the Muslims. This is based on the unilateral 
interests of the New Order in running the government, the background 
of Suharto who is an abangan Islam and a worldview against Islam gives 
influence to the model of government that it runs (Hefner & Horvatich,1997: 
77-79). So that Muslims suspect that the New Order government has been 
infiltrated by certain parties who aim to achieve the hidden interests (Hefner 
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& Horvatich,1997: 77-79). Considering the reading of Ariel Heryanto, the 
Soeharto government is rich in sharing political maneuvers that tend to be 
patrimonalism (Heryanto & Mandal, 2003: 4-5).
Since the beginning of 1966, Soeharto’s desire to obstruct the wishes and 
aspirations of Muslims is clear. The perception of the New Order regime 
when the country wanted to be built using Islamic conceptions. The failure 
of Masyumi leaders to rehabilitate his own party and other wishes such as the 
application of Islam as the basis of the state; the wishes of former Vice President 
Mohammad Hatta along with the HMI exponents and the PII established 
the PDII (Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia Indonesia) party; aspirations of 
Muhammadiyah leaders to reactivate the PII party (Partai Islam Indonesia) 
were strongly banned by the New Order regime. Even more frontal, Suharto 
with his “hands-on” politics suppressed radical Islamic groups potentially 
against the government (Alfian,1980:2-3).
The gait of Muslims in the political arena from the Old Order to the New 
Order experienced ups and downs. The tendency of the New Order to 
conduct political bureaucracy with the emasculation of the aspirations of 
Muslims seems to be a shortcut done. So that gave birth to a new awareness 
among Muslims that the political field is not the right path (Tebba, 1993: 
4-5). The fear of the New Order with Islam according to Din Syamsudin is 
an attempt to depolitise and desbolize Islam. This is an attempt to get rid of 
Islamic symbols from the political stage, the elimination of Islamic ideological 
parties ( Syamsuddin,2001:66-68). The large project implemented by the New 
Order wants to remove the awareness and attention of the underclass and 
deliberately alienate their leaders from the frenetic atmosphere that carries a 
critical pattern of Islam towards the state.
Suharto considers the political parties to be the source of the chaos and 
political instability that had occurred in the period of liberal democracy. This 
is what underlies Soeharto’s “nervousness” towards political parties. Suharto’s 
actions were regarded as an intervention in the bureaucracy of political parties, 
including Islamic parties (Crouch,1986:276). The New Order’s treatment 
of Islam gained the attention of scholars, one of whom was Hamka (Haji 
Abdul Karim Amrullah) a modernist from West Sumatra. He criticized the 
New Order regime for putting forward national development and economic 
strengthening but did not take into account the moral and ethical aspects 
of society. When religion is kept out of society, the resulting effect destroys 
the social order. He is a brave cleric that the New Order regime has legalized 
prostitution and gambling because it is easier to sell and the benefits gained 
(Bourchier &Hadiz,2014: 83).
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When the state can control religion, the phenomenon that occurred during 
the New Order according to Schwarz (1999) in the reading of Robert W. 
Hefner, “Islam is seen as a safe alternative to a very strict political structure” 
(Hefner,2000:5-6). Although the penetration of the New Order against Islamic 
parties is so strict, anyone can engage in public spheres but is restricted by 
strict rules. For example, in 1978 the government began to impose restrictions 
on organizing campus politics. Then in the years 1984-1985 the government 
required religious organizations and mass organizations to incorporate 
Pancasila ideology into its articles of association, if it refused the regime would 
make a ban.
Toward the end of the 1980s the tension between Muslims and the New Order 
began to improve, Suharto no longer worried about Islam. Although at the 
beginning of the New Order period, Islam was seen as political enemy number 
two after the communist (Anwar,2009: 355). The openness of Suharto’s 
attitude toward Islam is reflected in the ratification of educational law, which 
includes clauses of every public school should provide religious instruction 
to his students, establish the Law of Religious Courts, establish Board of 
Zakat, Infak and Sedekah (BAZIS), for female students in public schools are 
allowed to wear the hijab (An-Na’im, 2007:437). This period of establishment 
of various institutions increasingly vibrant, ranging from the integration of 
Islamic education into the system of public education, the establishment of 
ICMI by B.J Habibie, establishment of Muamalat bank as the first Islamic bank 
in Indonesia and the Bank of Credit Sharia and so on (Azra,2006:12).
PROSPERITY, ISLAMIC BOURGEOISIE, AND THE APPEARANCE 
OF MIDDLE CLASS MUSLIMS
The appearance of the New Order as a supporting deity in the era of the early 
1960s over the leadership of the Old Order which at that time was ostracized 
by the United States, European countries and Japan provided opportunities 
for the New Order to display its “power” in saving Indonesia at that time. 
At the end of Seokarno’s leadership, Indonesia was plagued by a very severe 
poverty that had an impact on the slow pace of domestic economic growth. To 
create development stability which has an impact on creating stable economic 
stability, at least the New Order uses the concept of Development Trilogy: (1) 
Economic growth; (2) Political stability; (3) Equity. These three things are the 
foundation for the New Order’s economic technocrats supporting the regime 
at that time. Furthermore, this ekomini growth can be well established when 
political stability is achieved perfectly. Therefore, to create a good economic 
stability is entrusted to the military. So that economic and military technocrats 
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into a dual-world vehicle that can not be separated (Budiman,2002:21).
The power of the New Order which always prioritized the economic and 
political sector development strategies contributed to the creation of 
Indonesia’s domestic conditions. The New Order claimed that the power he 
created was called a domestic stabilizer and dynamizer that had unlimited 
control functions. This is addressed by the New Order as a task that has 
been mandated by the state ideology of Pancasila in bringing prosperity to 
the people of Indonesia (Rinakit,2005:27-29). On the other hand, the New 
Order’s patrimonalism is so strongly exploit the patron relationship between 
subordinates and superiors. Political isolation is used to avoid political 
influence from outside the loyalists. This patrimonial policy is used to protect 
the power that has been institutionalized (Aspinall:2005,132).
At the time of the Old Order came to power, the people felt lied to by the 
accommodating of communist interests in the government. By Max Weber 
this patrimonial model was introduced as a term to explain how a ruler 
governs wealth and power based on traditional authority, not based on a 
system of rule of law and order (Aspinall:2005,133-136). Suharto was able to 
maintain this patrimonial model well until near the end of his rule in 1998. 
Patrimonialism is also called by Van Leur as a political capitalism or trade 
capitalism that wants to benefit certain parties, this can be a synthesis of 
the culture of patrimonialism adopted by the New Order. The state plays an 
important role in various sectors such as food production, education, public 
infrastructure and so on (Amir,2013:35).
John Meuleman describes the liberalization and economic globalization 
that took place in Indonesia as the New Order regime that began in the late 
1970s had an impact on improving the economic condition of the Muslim 
population as a whole. In the late 1980s an increasing number of Muslim 
communities were able to perform Hajj and after that Indonesia was known 
as the country that sends the world’s largest pilgrims outside of Saudi Arabia. 
Throughout that era mosque construction has mushroomed everywhere; the 
establishment of majlis taklim residing in luxury hotels and so on, as well as 
the development of Islamic schools and pesantren in urban areas. The rate 
of economic growth contributes to the increasing number of middle-class 
Muslims, of whom they are able to go abroad, and many also take part in 
social, political, and economic performances. So they become a symbol of the 
middle class establishment (Azra in Meuleman,2002:25).
This regime is smart enough to grasp the opportunities that make political 
stability necessary to overcome the backwardness of economic development. 
In such a situation the state benefits from the presence of the middle class 
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who sometimes becomes anti-system sponsors, so controlling the middle 
class means controlling state stability (Denny,2006:33). The opposite situation 
will occur when the development of the economic sector cannot be read well 
by the state which has an impact on economic instability and social inequality. 
Of course Indonesia as a Muslim-majority country has an interest in adjusting 
the conditions and situations that cause the appearance of the Muslim middle 
class in public areas (Burhanuddin, 2013:179).
On the other hand, because the middle class is pseudo, sometimes difficult to 
see as part of social-political-cultural structure of Indonesian society. However, 
if it is agreed that the definition of the middle class from the economic aspect 
with all its diversity is through the consumption pattern (Dick in Tanter,1990: 
64). Solvay Gerke explained that the consumption pattern of the middle class 
has changed from meeting basic needs (basic needs fulfilled approach) to 
meeting the needs of symbols, status and lifestyle (symbolic consumption 
approach). Therefore, the shift in the pattern of consumption fulfillment is not 
based on needs, but rather to strengthen the status of the class that prioritizes 
secondary and tertiary needs (Gerke in Huat, 2000:135:158).
TRENDY, POPULAR PIETY: MUSLIM MIDDLE CLASS IDENTITY 
AFTER THE FALL OF SOEHARTO
After ICMI was well instituted with the election of B.J Habibie as chairman, 
there was an interesting phenomenon after that in 1991 to coincide with the 
70th anniversary of Suharto performing the pilgrimage and his extended 
family. This was a public concern, for Suharto this was the first time he went 
on pilgrimage. He is often regarded as an abangan Muslim, thick with the 
practice of kejawen which is far from Islamic Orthodoxy and not so religious. 
Coming back from Makah, in addition to the title of Hajj, he added the name 
of Muhammad as a symbol that he was trying to be a pious Muslim. There is 
a growing assumption, when Suharto was elderly (growing older in Javanese 
terms) he increased his religiosity rather than before (Barton, 2008:218). 
Another opinion stated that Suharto’s departure to the holy land was 
considered a political act designed to convey a message to conservative santri 
Muslims from now on he could be a trustworthy person and with him they 
could work together. The truth is that since 1987 he has been thinking about 
embracing conservative Muslims who are used as a political counterweight 
other than the military (Barton, 2008:218). Later, Suharto’s trend was imitated 
by the middle class to perform Hajj and Umrah with luxury or plus facilities 
(Mufid, 2006:269).
Things that need attention also regarding the dynamics of economic growth 
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affect the process of mobility of certain community structures. In this case it 
is the class of santri to the higher grade class. They were previously a group 
based on the rural environment. They then migrated to the city, becoming 
an educated middle class that filled big cities like Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, 
Yogyakarta, Surabata, Padang, Medan, Ujung Pandang and so on. Which 
by Giddens, they are classified as middle class people who do not enjoy 
the property in the means of production, but belong to those who have the 
qualifications of education, skills, and technological skills (Hasbullah,2017: 
112-116). Political dynamics in Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto era in the 
early 2000s, at that time Abdurrahman Wahid issued Inpres No.6 of 2009 
which instructed the permissibility of ethnic Chinese to organize religious 
activities. The impact of this Presidential Instruction on Chinese society has 
the opportunity and freedom to carry out their religious activities. The Chinese 
New Year celebration is prohibited, with the Inpres every year they are free to 
celebrate and also affect the actualization of religious freedom in general.
In the midst of shock situations that test the existence of religious in Indonesia 
as described above, emerged a more universal and modern Islamic expression. 
Muslim Preacher’s Abdullah Gymnastiar who is more familiarly called with 
Aa Gym has nourished the da’wah content that can be accepted by the wider 
community. The concept of qolbu management popularized has brought a 
new da’wah model in the community. Not only did the Muslim community 
accept their da’wah, the non-Muslim community also received the da’wah 
that they carried. In addition, Ary Ginanjar Agustian also appeared with his 
ESQ (Emotional Spiritual Questient). The idea that he stretches integrates 
the concept of modern Islam that can be accepted by all circles. The training 
he held extended to all people, especially the upper middle class. In every 
training he held, he always set costs up to millions of rupiah. The combination 
of Islamic character with Western spiritual management is the hallmark of 
Ary Ginanjar in every session (Agustian, 2016).
The rise of national films became the spirit of displaying Islamic film identity. 
After the reforms, films were filmed by young filmmakers such as Hanung 
Bramantyo (2008) in his film “Ayat-Ayat Cinta” (2008), “Wanita Berkalung 
Sorban” (2009), “Sang Pencerah” (2010), then Chaerul Umam’s work “ Ketika 
Cinta Bertasbih “(2009). The films are making tremendous profits and 
are very popular among Muslims. The films are adapted from the novel by 
Habiburrahman el-Shirazzy, so that the characters raised into the films are 
a struggle between Muslim identity and piety that is becoming a trend, and 
is favored by young people. In addition, the existence of these films became 
social criticism and became anti-theses to the onslaught of Westernized 
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popular culture. And the filmmakers want to prove that Islam can synergize 
with modernization without having to leave the foundation of its teachings 
(Sasono in Daniels,2013:45-69). Religious music also enlivened the popular 
market, which in fact the early generation of religious music was seen in the 
Bimbo era in the 80s which incorporated the kasidah and gambus models into 
pop music. In 2004 the beginning of the Gigi music group released the album 
Raihlah Kemeaengan, which combined rock lyrics with religious lyrics. After 
that began to appear religious songs from various music bands such as, Ungu, 
Wali, Nidji, ST 12, Radja, and Coklat.
The non-educational spectacle is the reason for the creators to display the 
messages of Islam in the soap opera. The characterization of a pious person 
(shaleh) becomes the main topic in its cultivation, no longer highlight scenes 
such as relations between men and women who are not mahram, which looks 
at soap operas in general. Such symbols would present a popular culture of 
piety to the center of society, which would later become a populist alternative 
in the Muslim community (Subijanto,2013:73-86).1 In addition, Muslim 
fashion trends and Muslim magazines are increasingly diverse, such as 
Annida, Muslimah, Scarf, MusMagz, Alisha, Hijabella, Paras and so on. In 
addition to the emergence of an Islamic band (nasyid) inspired by overseas 
bands, they sang religious songs. Widespread salons are reserved for Muslim 
women, then the Hajj and Umroh Bureau, whose customers come from the 
urban middle class. Certainly in contrast to the lower-class, they have to 
register the hajj through the government. For Jean Gelman, the phenomenon 
fosters capitalism and showcased commercialism, reinforcing the identity of 
the middle class based on their religious experience (Taylor, 2013:181).
The mid-2000s social media revolution was so rapid, with the birth of 
Facebook (2004), Flickr (2004), BlackBerry Messenger (2005), Twitter (2006), 
WhatsApp (2009), Instagram (2010). The wide range of social media options 
has an impact on Muslim middle-class expression to their social environment. 
Until finally the development of smartphones using Android (2008) became 
the choice of the middle class which until 2016 the total downloads from the 
Google Play application reached 65 billion. The digital revolution does not 
stop there, but there are still new players. Gojek who stood in 2010 became 
a pioneer ojek online in Indonesia. Its success in 2015 has inspired similar 
services into Indonesia such as, Grab and Uber that established itself as a mass 
1 After the fall of Soeharto’s rule, many television shows displayed a pious identity as 
part of popular culture. This cannot be separated from the changing situation in placing Islam 
as a post-Soeharto cultural and political arena. On the other hand, the rise of Islamic shows 
on television as an interpretation of the creators to offer quality shows as a “form of resistance” 
to the influence of Western popular culture. Islamic television shows how religious discourse 
in public sphere, at the same time triggers popular piety in public sphere.
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service that so rapidly.
The shift of middle-class orientation of Muslims after the fall of the New 
Order created its own dynamics. In addition to the emergence of a variety 
of popular cultures that influence the Muslim middle-class perspective, the 
change in the mode of religiosity affects their behavior. Increased religiosity is 
not only visible in the worship performed. In consuming any product they pay 
attention to the functional and emotional benefits of a product. In addition 
they also care about the spiritual benefits of the product. Their knowledgeable 
and technology-savvy dominance combines with the growing understanding 
of religiosity that when they consume or intersect with various products 
must be in line with compliance with Islamic values  and teachings. This is 
in contrast to the West, as they move forward, the more secularized they do 
not even believe in the existence of God (Yuswohadi, 2012). The compliance 
of the Muslim middle class in carrying out the teachings of Islam by placing 
the elements of religiosity is not merely a desire, but it becomes manifest in 
obeying God’s command and away from His prohibitions. In consuming 
products and services, not just seek functional and emotional benefits like 
before. Spiritual benefits become part of the “enable” in their lives, especially 
in strengthening Islam and belief in Allah SWT.
CONCLUSION
The awareness of the Muslim middle class towards the symbols of Islam that 
are trying to be shown to the public sphere is followed by a shift in their 
Islamic orientation which is based on the process of new model Islamization. 
However, in different aspects the emergence of the Muslim middle class also 
results in changes in the mode of consumption of society. Such phenomena 
cannot be denied, because commodification in public space has become a 
necessity. The New Order, which had been in power for years, was not enough 
to arouse optimism for the Muslim middle class. In the beginning their efforts 
in contesting national politics were hampered by the regime. Later, when 
the New Order rule was over they were given the opportunity to take part 
in various fields. Popular Islamic culture is present as part of reculturation 
of Islam in the public sphere. This is as a resistance to Western culture which 
is feared to damage the nation. Therefore, the effort to display modern piety 
has always been the routine of the Muslim middle class in negotiating with 
globalization.
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